Digital fingerprinting is a technology for tracing the distribution of multimedia content and protecting them from unauthorized redistribution. Collusion attack is a cost effective attack against digital fingerprinting where several copies with the same content hut different fingerprints are combined to remove the original fingerprints. In this paper, we consider average attack and several nonlinear collusion attacks on independent Gaussian based fingerprints, and study the detection performance of several commonly used detection statistics in the literature under collusion attacks. Observing that these detection statistics are not specifically designed for collusion scenarios and do not take into account the characteristics of the newly generated fingerprints under collusion attacks, we propose pie-processing techniques to improve the detection performance of the detection statistics under collusion attacks.
INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of multimedia and communication technologies, an increasing amount of multimedia data are distributed through networks. This introduces an urgent demand to insure the proper distribution and usage of content, especially considering the ease of manipulating digital multimedia data.
To prevent illegal redistribution of the multimedia content, a digital fingerprinting system embeds unique identification information into each distributed copy to trace customers who use their copies inappropriately. There is a cost effective attack against digital fingerprinting, known as collusion. In collusion atlacks, several users (colluders) get together, combine information from different fingerprinted copies of the same host signal and generate a new copy where the original fingerprints are removed or attenuated [I] .
Digital fingerprinting should be resistant to collusion attacks as well as to common signal processings.
In the literature, there are several commonly used detection statistics [I, 2, 31 available for the detection of the existence of the additively embedded watermark in the test signals. To our knowledge, there is no work that compares their detection performance under collusion attacks. Also, these detection statistics are not specifically designed for detection of fingerprints under collusion attacks and ignore the statistical characteristics of the colluded fingerprints under different collusion attacks. In this paper, we focus on average and several nonlinear collusion attacks [I] on independent Gaussian based fingerprints and study the detection performance of different statistics under collusion attacks. We also take into consideration the statistical features of the colluded The authors can be reached at hzhao, minwu, wangzhen and kjrliu@eng.umd.edu 0-7803-7965-9/03/$17 .00 02003 IEEE fingerprints in the detection process to improve the detection performance under collusion attacks.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the fingerprinting and collusion attack system model. In Section 3, we analyze the detection performance of the detection statistics under collusion attacks. In Section 4. we study the performance of the statistics on independent Gaussian based fingerprints. Section 5 proposes the pre-processing stage to improve the detection performance of the statistics. Conclusions are drawn in Section 6.
SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a system that consists of three parts: fingerprint embedding, collusion attacks, and fingerprint detection. Spread spectrum watermark embedding [4,51 is widely used in watermark applications where the robustness of the watermark is required. Assume that there are a total of M users in the system. Given a host signal represented by a vector S with length N , the owner chooses a unique fingerprint W(') of length N for user i = 1 , . . , M, and generates the fingerprinted copy X(') by XI') = S + awl'). a is the Just-Noticeable-Difference (JND) from human visual models IS] to control the energy and guarantee the imperceptibility of the embedded fingerprints. We assume that the A4 fingerprints (WCi)} are chosen independently.
Assume that K users collude and SC is the set containing the indices of the colluders. We further assume that the collusion attack is in the same domain as the fingerprint embedding. With K different copies ( X ( k ) } r e s c , In this paper, we assume that p in the randomized negative attack is independent of the fingerprints {Wji)} and p = 0.5. Analyses of other nonlinear collusion attacks are available in 161. Note that for our model, applying the collusion attacks to the fingerprinted copies is equivalent to applying the collusion attacks to the fingerprints. F O~ example, v"" = minkEsc { S + a~( ' ) } = s + a mimes, {W')}.
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In the detection process, the detector removes the host signal from V and extracts the fingerprint Y .= g ( { W ' " } k , S , ) , where g(.) is the collusion function defined in (1). The detector measures the similarity between Y and each of the M original fingerprints { W ( , ! } , compares with a threshold, and outputs the estimated colluder set. In the literature, three detection statistics [I, 2, 31 are used to measure the similarity between the extracted fingerprint and the original fingerprint I: We adopt the commonly used criteria to measure the detection performance of the three statistics under collusion attacks: the probability of capturing at least one colluder (Pd) and the probability of accusing at least one innocent user ( J ' f P ) .
We also considered other measurements like the fraction of colluders that are successfully captured and the fraction of users that are innocently accused. From the analysis in [6], they have the same tendency as P, and Pfp. and therefore are not included in this paper. 
ANALYSIS OF THE DETECTION STATISTICS UNDER
and Pfp = 1-( l -Q ( h ) ) M -K ;
and Pfp LJ 1 -( 1 -Q ( h ) )
.
M-K
GAUSSIAN BASED FINGERPRINTS
It was shown in [I] that uniformly distributed fingerprints can be easily defeated by nonlinear collusion attacks. The simulation results in [I] also showed that Gaussian fingerprints are more resistant to nonlinear collusion attacks than uniform fingerprints. However, unlike uniform fingerprints, Gaussian fingerprints are not bounded and may introduce noticeable distortion in the fingerprinted copies. In order to achieve bath the robustness against collusion attacks and the imperceptibility of the embedded fingerprints. bounded Gaussian-like fingerprints were introduced in [61.
Assume that fx(-) and F x ( . ) are the pdf and cdf of a Gaussian random variable with zero mean and variance ub respectively. The pdf of a bounded Gaussian distribution f,!.,(.) is:
Given the pdf (12) and the analysis in Section 3, we can calculate From the simulation results in Figure I . we can see that, three detection statistics have similar performance under the average and randomized negative attacks; and under the minimum and maximum attacks, the Z statistics is more robust than the TN and q statistics. The detection performance under the maximum attack is the same as that under the minimum attack.
PRE-PROCESSING OF THE EXTRACTED
FINGERPRINTS m e three detection statistics we have studied so far are not specifically designed for collusion scenarios, and do not exploit the statistical features of the extracted fingerprints under collusion attacks. One of such features is the sample mean of the extracted fiogerprints. From the histogram plots of the extracted fingerprints under different attacks as shown in Figure 2 , we observe different patterns of the sample means of the extracted fingerprints: the average attack yields an approximately zero sample mean; the minimum and maximum attacks yield a negative and a positive sample means, respectively; and the extracted fingerprint components under the randomized negative attack are from two distributions, one with a negative mean, the other with a positive mean.
Recall from ( 6 ) that ai,Ho is proportional tn the second mw men1 of the extracted fingerprint, subtracting the sample mean from the extracted fingerprint will reduce its second moment, thus improve the detection performance. Molivaled by this intuition, we propose a pie-processing stage in the detection roccss. Given the extracted fingerprint {Y, = g({W;}kEs,J}[l,
we first investigate its histogram. If a single non-zero sample mean is observed, we subtract it from the extracted fingerprint, and then apply the detection statistics. If the fingerprint components are generated from two (or more) distributions, we need to cluster components into different distributions and then subtract the sample mean of each distribution from those fingerprint components in that distribution correspondingly. In our problem, for the randomized nega- 
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The analyses of the maximum and randomized negative attacks are similar and thus omitted here. With (13). the analysis of (Pd, P,,) with this pre-processing stage is the same as in Section 3.3.
The simulation results in Figure 3 show that, with the preprocessing stage, the detection performance under the minimum, maximum and randomized negative attacks is improved, and three statistics have similar performance. The performance under the maximum attack is the same as that under the minimum attack.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have studied the detection performance of commonly used detection statistics on independent Gaussian based fingerprints under collusion attacks. We have shown that, with the three detection statistics as defined in the literature and without any modification, the Z statistics is more resistant to the minimum and maximum attacks than the TN and q statistics, while the three statistics have similar performance under other collusion attacks.
Observing different pattems of the sample means of the extracted fingerprints under different collusion attacks, we have also introduced a pre-processing stage to improve the detection performance and we have shown that, with the pre-processing stage, the detection performance is improved and the three detection statistics
